The Mismeasure of War
By Anita Gohdes, Megan Price, and Patrick Ball
Several media organizations including Reuters,
Foreign
Policy and New
Scientist covered the January 21 release of the 2009 Human Security
Report (HSR) entitled, “The
Shrinking Cost of War.” The main thesis of the HRS authors,
Andrew Mack et al, is that “nationwide mortality rates actually
fall during most wars” and that “today’s wars
rarely kill enough people to reverse the decline in peacetime mortality
that has been underway in the developing world for more than 30
years.” This claim is based in large part on the authors’
graphical representations of pre- and post-conflict mortality rates
for a variety of countries, and on their critique of five surveys
conducted by the International
Rescue Committee (IRC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo between
2000 and 2007.
The authors’ illustration of the technical mistakes
made by the IRC is necessary and valuable for scientific advancement.
We fully agree with their assessment that some of the IRC extrapolations
are inappropriate, that IRC should have calculated a population-weighted
mortality estimate and that the estimates contain very high levels
of uncertainty. Each of these concerns suggests a corrective process
by which better estimates could be made. In their argument, however,
the HSR authors did not choose this course.
We are deeply skeptical of the methods and data that
the authors use to conclude that conflict-related deaths are decreasing.
We are equally concerned about the implications of the authors’
conclusions and recommendations with respect to the current academic
discussion on how to count deaths in conflict situations. See Andrew
Gelman’s blog and the HSR’s own discussion
site for an overview of this discussion. We believe that the
authors should examine their own data on mortality related deaths
with the same rigor with which they critique the recent IRC surveys.
If they did this, they would find that they have inadequate information
to conclude anything about the trend in war-related lethality in
recent decades.
The central evidence that the authors provide for “The
Shrinking Cost of War” is delivered as a series of graphs.
There are two problems with the authors’ reasoning.
First, the mortality estimates of children under five described
in Figure 2.1 of the report should include an appropriate measure
of uncertainty. The purported trend could be overwhelmed by the
error of the estimates describing child mortality, but these errors
are not presented in the report. Therefore, it is impossible to
test the strength of the trend versus the magnitude of the error.
Second, and even more importantly, the graphs showing
a worldwide decline in war-related lethality, in Figures 2.5 and
2.6 of the report, include data from the PRIO Center for the Study
of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo and the
UCD/
HSRP Uppsala Conflict Data Program /Human Security Report Project
Dataset, the World Bank, “World
Development Indicators” and the Inter-Agency Child Mortality
Estimation Group (IACMEG), “Child
Mortality Estimates Info.”
These datasets include expert opinions, convenience datasets, and
reproducible estimates from multiple-systems estimation and probability-based
surveys. The quality and uncertainty of such an incompatible collection
of datasets cannot be evaluated. The plausibility of the trends
presented by the authors cannot be assessed.
In particular, expert opinions about the magnitude of violence are
little more than guesses. These numbers are the statistical equivalent
of hearsay. It is impossible to scientifically debate speculations,
and it is impossible to reproduce speculations by a principled process
in alignment with the scientific method.
Some of the other sources for the authors’ conclusions are
convenience samples. A convenience sample is simply data that can
be conveniently observed via witness accounts, press sources, or
other means. These databases may be useful collections of cases,
and organizing information in this form enables many non-statistical
descriptions of violence.
However, convenience samples are highly unlikely to represent the
underlying statistical patterns or magnitude of conflict related
deaths. They cannot be used to extrapolate to a population beyond
what was observed, and they are not necessarily representative of
any population. In our experience, no two convenience samples about
the same country tell the same statistical story.
The core problem with both expert opinions and convenience samples
is that we have no way of scientifically measuring just how unrepresentative
they actually are of the population they are attempting to measure.
The HSR’s broadest claim is that “[t]he average conflict
in the new millennium kills 90 percent fewer people each year than
did the average conflict in the 1950s (p. 2),” and that there
has been a “20-year decline in conflict numbers” (p.
7). Due to the weaknesses in the data, there is no way of reproducibly
or transparently verifying or testing this claim.
In the HSR and elsewhere, the HSR authors have shown that recent
conflicts have been seriously mismeasured. Certainly this debate
would benefit from a scrutiny of expert opinions and convenience
samples as intense as that which the HSR authors’ have brought
to the study of the IRC surveys.
Perhaps earlier conflicts were as mismeasured as recent conflicts.
The HSR authors’ conclusion that the number of deaths in today’s
wars is declining may be right, or it might be wrong. But we just
do not know much about the quality of estimates from further back
in history. Therefore, the only responsible conclusion is that we
simply don’t know what the trend in war-related deaths looks
like. More rigorous research is needed.
We welcome the authors’ contribution to the ongoing debate
about measuring war-related mortality. Technical critique of existing
work is at the core of the scientific process. In our opinion, the
HSR authors have done the IRC and the community of human rights
analysts a service by highlighting errors in the Congo survey.
The response to errors with statistical estimates must not be that
we abandon science by relying on expert opinions and convenience
samples. Quite the opposite. The fact that the IRC’s work
has been shown by the HSR authors to be flawed should remind us
to limit our conclusions narrowly to what can be defended by the
most appropriate and advanced scientific methods for the question
at hand.
|